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Abstract This paper analyses whether the aggregation of
individual happiness scores to a National Happiness Index
can still be trusted once governments have proclaimed their
main objective to be the pursuit—or even maximization—
of this National Happiness Index. The answer to this
investigation is clear-cut: as soon as the National Happi-
ness Index has become a policy goal, it can no longer be
trusted to reflect people’s true happiness. Rather, the Index
will be systematically distorted due to the incentive for
citizens to answer strategically and the incentive for gov-
ernment to manipulate the Index in its favour. Such a
distortion would arise even if the measurement of sub-
jective well-being correctly reflected actual happiness
before the intervention of government. Governments in a
democracy should establish the conditions enabling indi-
viduals to become happy. The valuable and important
results of happiness research should be introduced into the
political process. Each person should be free to pursue
happiness according to his or her preferences. This process
is supported by obedience to the rule of law, human rights
and free media, as well as by extended political partici-
pation rights, decentralized public decision-making, an
open and effective education system fostering upward
mobility and the possibility to find suitable employment.
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1 Quantitative Happiness Research
Philosophers have studied happiness from the very begin-
ning of their science more than 1,000 years ago. Recently,
research on happiness has been fundamentally transformed
by social psychologists,1 who have shown us how to
measure happiness in a reliable way. Economists2 have
followed suit and have introduced advanced econometric
techniques to study the subject. They have, in particular,
analysed the influence of economic determinants such as
income, unemployment, inflation and inequality on
happiness.3B. S. Frey
Warwick Business School, University of Warwick,
Coventry, UK
B. S. Frey
Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen, Friedrichshafen, Germany
B. S. Frey
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts
(CREMA), Basel, Switzerland
B. S. Frey (&)  J. Gallus
University of Zurich, Hottingerstrasse 10, 8032 Zurich,
Switzerland
e-mail: bruno.frey@econ.uzh.ch
J. Gallus
e-mail: jana.gallus@econ.uzh.ch
1 Csikszentmihalyi (1992), Kahneman et al. (1999), Wilson and
Gilbert (2003), Lyubomirsky (2008), Diener (2009), Franklin (2010).
2 Van Praag and Kapteyn (1973) and Easterlin (1974) are pathbreak-
ing. See the surveys by Frey and Stutzer (2002a, b, c, 2005), Di Tella
and MacCulloch (2006), Dolan et al. (2008), Frey (2008), and the
collection of articles by Easterlin (2002, 2010), Eid and Larsen
(2008), Dutt and Radcliff (2009), Frey and Stutzer (2012).
3 Social scientists beyond economists have also engaged in the study
of happiness, in particular the sociologist (Veenhoven 1989) and the
political scientist (Lane 2000). See also Feierabend and Feierabend
(1966), Davies (1970) and Gurr (1970).
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Research on subjective well-being (the more precise
term for happiness) distinguishes three concepts (see Frey
and Stutzer 1999):
• positive affect capturing short run emotional states of
mind;
• life satisfaction considering more cognitive and long-
term aspects; and
• eudaimonia as the most fundamental concept going
back to Greek philosophy and referring to a good and
virtuous life as a whole.
Quantitative research on well-being focuses on life
satisfaction as the intermediate concept: it is more basic
than a fleeting emotional reaction, but refrains from
claiming that it has any normative content. This is the
concept mainly discussed in this contribution.4 The pur-
pose is not to compare the three concepts of happiness in a
thorough way but rather to analyse how the concept of life
satisfaction is transformed once it has become the official
goal of government policy.
Section 2 discusses life satisfaction as a particular var-
iant of subjective well-being. The following section shows
how an aggregate measure of happiness (the ‘‘National
Happiness Index’’) becomes the subject of political
manipulation once it has become an official goal of gov-
ernment policy. The concluding section reconsiders the
concept of happiness in the light of these systematic
manipulations by government and draws consequences for
happiness policy.
2 Life Satisfaction
Life satisfaction is normally measured in representative
surveys5 by asking the question: ‘‘Taken overall, how
satisfied are you with the life you lead?’’ This question
makes clear that a reasoned answer is expected. The survey
results correspond well to behaviours commonly associated
with happiness: happy individuals smile more in social
interactions; they initiate more social contacts, are more
optimistic about the future, help more, have less problems
at work, commit less suicides, tolerate more frustration and
are in better health and live longer due to a better func-
tioning immune system.6 The measures have been found to
be reliable, consistent and valid (Diener 2009; Diener et al.
2012).
Life satisfaction has been extensively used in the eco-
nomics of happiness by econometrically estimating a
happiness function in which life satisfaction is the depen-
dent variable to be explained by a large set of determinants
comprising genetic (Inglehart and Klingemann 2000; De
Neve et al. 2012), socio-demographic (e.g., age, family
status, children; Frey and Stutzer 2002b), economic
[income, unemployment, inflation, inequality; see, e.g.,
Diener and Suh (2000), Alesina et al. (2004)], cultural and
religious as well as political and institutional (extent of
political participation rights and decentralisation; Frey and
Stutzer 2002b) factors. Some of the results may appear
rather obvious; for instance that persons with higher
income on average are happier than those with lower
income, or that inflation reduces happiness (Di Tella et al.
2001). Other findings, however, were rather unforeseen.
Before the advent of economic happiness research, losing
one’s job was barely considered to have a strong negative
effect on life satisfaction—otherwise the oft-advanced
proposition that unemployment is mostly voluntary7 would
have been untenable. Other determinants of happiness,
such as friendship, religion or materialism, have rarely
been taken into account in economics. Some influences are
unexpected and/or against standard economic theory: the
young and the old are (ceteris paribus) happier than those
of medium age (Frey and Stutzer 2002b); the self-
employed are happier despite the fact that they work harder
and longer, bear more risk and on average have lower
incomes than those employed by an institution (Benz and
Frey 2008); donating money and working as a volunteer
contribute to the givers’ happiness (Meier and Stutzer
2008); and rising income over time does not raise happi-
ness, at least not in a linear way (Frey and Stutzer 2002a:
413–416). Well-being research also helps to identify
activities depressing happiness, such as commuting (Stut-
zer and Frey 2008) or having a materialistic attitude to life.
Such findings, e.g., that we tend to mispredict the utility
gained from consumption in the future, raise doubts about
human rationality under well-defined conditions (rather
than in a general and therefore rather useless way).
3 Transformation of the Concept of Happiness
3.1 Political Intervention
The happiness measures that we have shortly discussed
above rely on the assumption that the individuals
4 In line with the literature, however, the more appealing term
‘‘happiness’’ will be generally used whenever there is no danger of
misunderstanding.
5 There are other approaches to measurement such as the Day
Reconstruction Method by Kahneman et al. (2004) or the U-index
(Kahneman and Krueger 2006).
6 See Frey and Stutzer (2002a, b), Frey (2008), and especially for
length and longevity Diener and Chan (2011), summarized in Frey
(2011).
7 For a similar argument see Minford (1983), as quoted in Clark and
Oswald (1994).
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concerned reply to the survey questions in a truthful way.
Random factors possibly influencing the answers (such as,
for example, the weather, or some purely personal irregu-
larity) are not relevant because they cancel each other out
when they are aggregated. The answers therefore have
considerable trustworthiness though they must, of course,
be taken with a measure of caution. One can well argue that
the happiness measures are not worse than other measures
commonly used in economics, such as imports, exports,
income or Gross National Product. They are subject to
well-known limitations8 but have proven to be very useful
for capturing the state of the economy. Interpreted with
care, the aggregate concept of individual well-being, the
National Happiness Indicator, is useful—in particular when
compared to the more narrow concept of Gross National
Income.
Recently, the governments of the United Kingdom,
France, Germany and even China stated that they wanted to
pursue National Happiness as a prime goal of policy. This
had already been done a long time ago by the Kingdom of
Bhutan and is to some extent also enshrined in the con-
stitution of the United States (‘‘the pursuit of happiness’’).
However: Once this policy goal is fully enacted and pur-
sued, the relationship between actual and measured hap-
piness is fundamentally disrupted. There are two reasons
for this disruption:
(a) The persons asked about their satisfaction with the
life they lead are induced to answer strategically, i.e.,
they have an incentive to misrepresent their true state
of well-being;
(b) The governments have a strong incentive as well as
many possibilities to manipulate the National Happi-
ness Index in their favour.
These two kinds of distortions that affect the National
Happiness Index will be discussed in turn.
3.2 Strategic Misrepresentation of Subjective Well-
Being
Once governments declare the maximization—or at least
the pursuit—of the National Happiness Index to be their
primary policy goal, individuals will tend to misrepresent
their happiness levels for strategic reasons. They have an
incentive to support or to punish the government. An
individual with a left-wing ideology living under a right-
wing government is inclined to state that she is less happy
than she actually is. She therewith signals her disapproval
with the politicians in power. Conversely, a right-wing
person living under a right-wing government tends to state
that he is happier than he is in actual fact. He therewith
signals his approval of the politicians in power. The per-
sons asked are able to misrepresent their state of happiness
at no cost, as their true state of happiness cannot be directly
observed. The cost of misrepresentation may consist in
moral qualms of having indicated a wrong happiness level.
Most people are probably hardly bothered by these moral
considerations.
Proclaiming an increase in the National Happiness Index
as an official government goal will lead to a systematic
distortion of the measured subjective happiness levels. It
cannot a priori be stated in what direction the truthfulness
of the National Happiness Index will be affected. The
overall outcome will be determined by the extent of the
upward or downward misrepresentation by individuals as
well as by the size of the groups involved.
3.3 Manipulation of the National Happiness Index
by Government
The government is strongly motivated to manipulate
important economic indicators such as the unemployment
and inflation rates, national income, the budget deficit and
the public debt. It is aware that it is not only the actual
experiences that count when the citizens cast their vote at
election time. Most citizens have only limited direct
experience about economic factors. They therefore resort to
how they perceive the state of the economy to be. These
perceptions are strongly shaped by the media, which
reproduce the official statistical figures provided by the
Central Statistical Office, a public agency responsible to
government.
Governments have substantial possibilities to manipu-
late these statistical indicators. They have frequently
exploited these opportunities to their advantage (see also
Frey and Gallus 2012).
Undesirable statistics are regularly hidden. Governments
seem to do so with great ease.9 One method consists in
outsourcing part of the public debt to bodies not directly
related to government. Public debt is also diminished in
most countries by the fact that the implicit public debt
(comprising future expenditures that have contractually
been promised) is rarely included in the statistics. Similar
practices are regularly applied with respect to the yearly
budget deficit. Italy, Greece and California are just some
examples, which have recently been particularly visible
8 With respect to national income, for instance, some governments
have simply included parts of the shadow economy so as to boost the
figures. It remains unknown, however, to what extent these practices
have occurred (see, e.g., Schneider and Enste 2002; Torgler et al.
2010; Schneider 2011).
9 On this and the following, see, e.g., Dafflon and Rossi (1999), Forte
(2001), Milesi-Ferretti (2004), Koen and Van den Noord (2005), Von
Hagen and Wolff (2006), Balassone et al. (2007), Buti et al. (2007),
Sachversta¨ndigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung (2009) and European Commission (2010).
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(see, e.g., The Economist 2012a). Other seemingly objec-
tive figures that are regularly the target of ‘‘creative
accounting’’ are the unemployment rate, where the long-
term unemployed are often excluded from the counts (see,
e.g., Gregg 1994; Webster 2002), and the inflation rate
(see, e.g., The Economist 2012b on the Argentinian case).
The manipulation of particular economic indicators is
thus widespread; it may even be the rule rather than the
exception. Not surprisingly, governments regularly deny
such manipulating activity.
The Human Development Index and other broad indi-
cators of economic development also offer governments
substantial possibilities for manipulation. Politicians are
even more strongly motivated to manipulate the National
Happiness Index in their favour. The name, ‘‘National
Happiness Indicator’’, indicates that it must be the over-
arching goal of policy. National Happiness therefore
becomes the self-declared policy priority. The individuals
and the media thus focus on the development of the
National Happiness Index. Political discussion becomes
dominated by changes in that index as it claims to capture
the overall well-being of the population. The government is
strongly motivated to prevent a fall in the National Hap-
piness Index. It can do so with policies improving actual
conditions and therewith raising the Index. However, it can
also manipulate the Index without improving the actual
conditions and well-being of the population (see also Frey
and Gallus 2013).
The government can readily manipulate the National
Happiness Index in its favour. The Index is based on
subjective evaluations of respondents to surveys. These can
be more easily manipulated than indicators based on more
objective data, such as most of the components in the Gross
National Product.
To begin with, government can try to influence people’s
perception of the state of the economy. An important
channel for such an endeavour is the media. It has an
important impact on the population’s mood, as shown for
instance by Deaton (2012). The next stage where govern-
ment can manipulate the happiness index is the survey
design. The arrangement of the questions as well as con-
textual factors have been shown to have an impact on stated
happiness (ibid.). Groups that are expected to report very
low levels of happiness (e.g., prisoners) can be excluded,
while those at the other end of the spectrum of the happiness
scale (e.g., tourists) can be included. At the stage of survey
implementation, governments can follow up non-respon-
dents who are expected to report high levels of happiness,
while remaining passive on non-respondents who are
expected to report low levels of happiness (e.g., those living
in areas with high unemployment). Once the survey has
been completed, government can exclude ‘‘outliers’’ with
low levels of unemployment, arguing that those respondents
must have been insincere when answering the questions
(see, e.g., Simmons et al. 2011). Government can also resort
to more outright forms of manipulation, e.g., by changing or
dropping responses. The results cannot be traced back to an
observable underlying truth since they are entirely sub-
jective. Finally, government can choose to declare the
adoption of a new—more favourable—happiness indicator
as a leading index. If the most prevalent method of repre-
sentative surveys is not conducive to its goals, government
can opt from a wide panoply of other methods, such as the
Day Reconstruction Method or the U-Index, which mea-
sures the time an individual feels unhappy, brain scanning
or blood pressure (see, e.g., De Prycker 2010; Oswald and
Powdthavee 2008).
To summarise, once the subjective well-being of the
population—as captured by the National Happiness
Index—is declared the unique policy goal, governments
have a clear incentive and many possibilities to manipulate
this National Happiness Index in their favour. As a conse-
quence, the National Happiness Index will be distorted and
no longer a reliable indicator of the citizens’ well-being.
4 The Concept of Happiness Reconsidered
Research on subjective well-being has devoted little
attention to the question of what happiness actually is.
Rather, based on quantitative measurements of happiness,
psychologists, economists and other social scientists have
sought to identify what factors determine individuals’
happiness and what consequences should follow. This
approach deviates from the main interest of philosophers
and thus sets the basis for a productive division of labour
among researchers from different disciplines.
This paper also deviates from the issue of what happi-
ness is. Rather, it analyses the question of whether the
aggregation of individual happiness scores to a National
Happiness Index can still be trusted when governments
proclaim that their main objective is to pursue, and even
maximize, this National Happiness Index. The answer to
this investigation is unambiguous: once the National
Happiness Index has become a policy goal, it can no longer
be trusted to reflect the true happiness of people. The Index
will rather be systematically distorted due to the incentive
for citizens to answer strategically and the incentive for
government to manipulate the Index in its favour. This
would apply even if the measurement of subjective well-
being had approximated actual happiness well before the
intervention of government.
Two consequences follow:
(a) The National Happiness Index will no longer be a
reliable indicator of people’s happiness. It will no
210 B. S. Frey, J. Gallus
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longer reflect how happy people are because the
information included in the National Happiness Index
will be distorted. It may well be that on the basis of
this Index the government will claim that its citizens
have become happier while in actual fact they have
become less happy, or even miserable.
(b) For policy purposes, it is advantageous to use many
different aggregate indicators to capture the popula-
tion’s well-being. This implies using the conventional
economic indicators, in particular Gross National
Income and extensions such as the Human Develop-
ment Index. In addition, issue-specific indicators such
as the rate of unemployment, the rate of inflation and
income distribution convey important information.
While they are also subject to manipulation by
government (as argued above) they are based on less
subjective measures than is the National Happiness
Index. Moreover, the larger the number of indices
used to capture the effects of government policy, the
better observers can detect distortions. This is partly
due to the fact that government politicians find it
difficult to manipulate many different indicators in
their favour, rather than concentrating only on the
manipulation of a single National Happiness Index.
More fundamentally, citizens should be advised to reject
the idea of governments maximizing their happiness. This
corresponds to a ‘‘benevolent dictator’’ approach (Bucha-
nan and Tullock 1962; Brennan and Buchanan 1985),
which undermines democracy. It is tantamount to a polit-
ical arrangement in which the ‘‘right’’ policy is imposed
from above and it undermines the political discourse
among citizens with different views and preferences (see,
more fully, Frey and Gallus 2012; Frey and Stutzer 2012).
Rather, governments in a democracy should establish the
conditions enabling individuals to become happy. The
valuable and important results of happiness research should
be introduced into the political process. Each and every
person should be free to pursue happiness according to his
or her preferences. This process is supported by obedience
to the rule of law and human rights, by free media as well
as by extended political participation rights, decentralized
public decision-making, an open and effective education
system fostering upward mobility and by the possibility to
find suitable employment.
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